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1. INTRODUCTION
The evidence, that prices of syndicated corporate loans differ between the
European and U.S. markets, with interest rate spreads, smaller in Europe by
about 30 basis points on average over the past decade, after controlling for risk
and other factors, is statistically significant. The differences are economically and
statistically significant, with spreads in the European market about 20 percent
less than comparable spreads in the U.S. Levels of differences are larger for riski-
er borrowers, but differences are proportional to levels of spreads across the risk
spectrum. I cannot reject a hypothesis that price differences are as large today as
they were a decade ago. I control for a host of factors known (or thought) to
affect corporate debt decisions and pricing, but such controls have little effect on
the pricing difference across markets. I interpret the evidence as implying that
important determinants of loan pricing remain to be identified in the literature.
It is a pricing puzzle. In contrast, lenders cross borders to a much greater extent.
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WORLD CORPORATE LOAN MARKETS FOR
RAISING NEW CAPITAL – DOES DISTANCE STILL
MATTER: ARE FINANCIAL ASSETS PRICED
LOCALLY OR GLOBALLY?
ORIGINALNI NAU^NI RADOVI/SCIENTIFIC PAPERS
ABSTRACT: Though the paper focuses on
pricing, as the background I provide some
evidence about loan flows across markets in
the form of borrowers’ and lenders’ propen-
sity to issue outside their natural home
market. The data show that borrowers stay
home when they can and that they tend to
issue in Europe when they must issue
abroad. That is, borrowers domiciled in
one of the major markets (Europe, U.S.,
and Asia) almost always issue in that mar-
ket, whereas borrowers in more remote
locations usually issue in the European
market. For example, borrowers from Latin
America are overwhelmingly issuing in
Europe rather than in the U.S. market.
KEYWORDS:  loans, corporate debt,
market integration, globalization
JEL: C10, E44, F36, G11, O11, P51About one-quarter of the volume of lending in the U.S. and European markets is
provided by lenders headquartered elsewhere. Nevertheless, syndicated loan par-
ticipations are still characterized by a significant home “bias.” I analyze the
impact of borrower and lender domicile, but cast my analysis in terms of market
location because it is consistent with market practice and because it provides the
most illuminating view. The reasons why “market” matters are a subject for
future research this paper only provides evidence that it does. 
The natural first hypothesis that might explain the differences in loan prices
that I observe is that the characteristics of loans and borrowers differ across sub-
samples, that is, all else is not equal. 
My empirical tests control for a wide variety of factors and mechanisms sug-
gested in the corporate debt and financial intermediation literatures, including
potential cross-market differences in: non-price terms of loans; asymmetric
information or moral hazard (Petersen, Mitchell, and Raghuram Rajan, 2002);
legal regime (La Porta et al 1997); multi-product package pricing practices; regu-
lation (McCauley and Seth 1992); and others. I cannot reject a hypothesis that
my finding is evidence of market inefficiency in the sense of myopic behavior by
market participants, but the size of the pricing difference and the sophistication
of syndicated loan market participants lead me to discount this possibility. The
most active lenders are large banks headquartered in a variety of nations, each
with significant international operations. Many lend in both the U.S. and
Europe. Moreover, borrowers are large corporations, many with international
operations. It is difficult to believe that such market participants would fail to
exploit obvious opportunities to gain by crossing borders. I am left with an eco-
nomically material pricing puzzle that I believe must be due to a friction that is
not yet well understood, at least in the context of debt markets, and thus my
results can be viewed as an implicit call for research into the nature of corporate
loan markets that can explain the results. I have only one speculation to offer
about the friction: Whatever is responsible for the home bias I observe may be an
important element of the explanation, because limits to bank arbitrage of loan
pricing differences seems to be a prerequisite for persistence of substantial differ-
ences. For example, the loan market trade press hints at explanations involving
limited cross-region lending and borrowing by banks combined with differences
in competition within regions. Recent articles have noted that European banks
are awash in deposits and that they compete fiercely in making investments in
Europe, driving down loan spreads. Ashcraft and Morgan (2003) suggest that a
high incidence of relatively high-spread loans in a bank’s portfolio might be evi-
dence of excessive risk-taking. My evidence implies that controlling for differ-
ences in loan and borrower characteristics may be important to proper regulato-
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Borut Vojinovi~ry use of loan price information. For macroeconomists, my evidence implies that
even large corporate loan markets of major industrial nations may be rather seg-
mented. Thus, domestic regulatory and monetary policies may have a significant
impact on the availability of loan finance and economic activity (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995).
One strand of the literature, including Flood and Rose (2003), tests whether
the law of one price holds across markets, interpreting rejections as evidence of
less than fully integrated markets. Another focuses on portfolio shares and capi-
tal flows (Karolyi and Stulz (2002) offer a survey). A third strand, including
Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003) and Santos and Tsatsaronis (2002), exam-
ines whether the nationality of providers of financial services affects prices or
quantities of such services. Most of the literature focuses on equity, bond and
money markets. Adam et al 2002 offer a review that implies that some markets
are integrated while others are not.
Other papers focused on syndicated lending include Nini (2003), which
examines syndicated lending in emerging markets; Esty (2002), which examine
syndicated project finance loans; Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), which studies
syndicated loans in the U.S.; and Bae and Goyal (2003) and Casolaro, Focarelli,
and Pozzolo (2003), which examine the pricing of internationally syndicated
loans, and Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998), which reports estimates of factor
models for highly leveraged transaction loans. 
2. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Though loans have been syndicated at least since the Medici era, the market
became organized and prominent beginning in the 1960s, serving large multina-
tional corporations, sovereigns, and quasi-governmental entities. Syndicated
loans are typically floating-rate debt in which the interest rate paid on outstand-
ing balances is specified as a market-determined base rate plus a spread specified
in the loan contract. The rate the borrowers pays is reset periodically to reflect
the market value of the base rate at the time. The base rate is frequently LIBOR,
but EURIBOR, TIBOR and other base rates are also used. All lenders are party to
the same debt contract. During syndication, one or more lead lenders seek other
lenders to be party to the contract, relieving the borrower of the need to find
lenders and to negotiate a separate contract with each lender. Loans are charac-
terized according to the location of the market in which they are issued as well as
by the location of the borrower and the lenders. For example, the early modern
syndicated loan market was centred in London and served borrowers from
around the world, perhaps in part because London hosted the most important
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capitalmarket for the Eurodollar bank deposits that paid LIBOR. Volumes grew espe-
cially rapidly in the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s, but since
1992 volume has grown somewhat more rapidly in the European and Asian mar-
kets than in the U.S. market (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Issuance volume in the major syndicated loan markets
Loans issued in currencies other than dollars are converted to U.S. dollar
amounts in Loanware using exchange rates on or near the loan contract date.
Such amounts are then converted to 1996 constant dollars using the GDP defla-
tor. Face amounts of loan commitments are used, that is, undrawn commit-
ments are included in totals.
Ratings are my primary measure of borrower credit quality. Loanware
includes ratings, but I also match borrowers by name with Moody’s Default Risk
Service database, which includes a history of Moody’s corporate rating actions,
in order to measure the evolution of borrower credit quality after loans are made
(Covtiz and Harrison (2003) examine rating migrations). Where both a Moody’s
and an S&P rating are available, I use the riskier of the two ratings (results are
robust to using just Moody’s or just S&P ratings). My primary measure of loan
price is an all-in interest rate spread that includes the contract spread over
LIBOR on the loan’s outstanding balance plus any annual fees and any upfront
fee prorated over the life of the loan. Fee information is often missing in
Loanware, so I include in factor models a dummy variable for the presence of fee
information that helps control for such noise in my pricing measure. To limit the
influence of outliers, I winsorize spreads at the 1st and 95th percentiles for each
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Borut Vojinovi~grade. For example, I set values larger than the 95th percentile to the value at the
95th percentile. Results are robust to use of other percentiles as cut-offs and to
use of raw spreads.
3. LOAN FLOWS
Some facts about loan flows are useful background for an examination of
pricing differences. If most borrowers and lenders operate only in their home
markets then the forces tending to promote price convergence may be weak,
although one would still expect similar risks to be priced similarly in long-run
equilibrium. Panel A of Table 1 displays the percentage of syndicated loan vol-
ume in the European, U.S. and Asian syndicated loan markets that is due to
activity by borrowers in different domiciles. Panel B shows how borrowers in
each domicile allocate their issuance across the three markets. The table reveals
that borrowers usually stay home, and that Europe is usually the market of
choice for borrowers located outside the three markets. That is, U.S. firms almost
always issue in the U.S. market, European firms in the European market, and
Asian firms in the Asian market, as shown by fractions in excess of 90 percent in
Panel B. However, firms with no natural local syndicated loan market, most
prominently firms from Latin American and from the “Other” category, tend to
use the European market, not the U.S. market, even though the U.S. market is
larger by volume. 
Table 1. Relationship of market region and borrower domicile
Data are for all multi-lender loans reported in Loanware as made in the three
markets during 1992-2002. Panel A examines the composition of each market in
terms of borrower domicile, whereas Panel B examines the market choices of
borrowers from each domicile, one at a time. 
Panel A. Percentage of syndicated loan volume for each market due to
borrowers in each domicile 
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capital
Borrower domicile                   U.S. market       European market               Asian & SW     
                                                                                                                          Pacific market 
United States 
Europe  
Latin America  
Canada  
Asia & SW Pacific 
Other  
Total 
97,7 
0,5 
0,2 
1,0 
0,1 
0,5 
100 
3,2 
             81,8 
6,3 
0,6 
1,9 
6,2 
               100 
2,6 
1,0 
0,3 
0,0 
             94,4 
1,7 
100 Panel B. Percentage of syndicated loan volume issued by borrowers in each
domicile appearing in each market
Even Canadian firms issue 19 percent of their loans in the European market,
which is surprising given the tight integration of U.S. and Canadian financial
markets. Latin American borrowers’ preference for the European market does
not appear to be due to a preference for Spanish or Portuguese banks. Such
banks’ share of Latin American borrower loans is less than 10 percent and similar
to their share of European borrower loans. It is possible that non-US and non-
Asian borrowers use the European market for historical reasons (as noted,
London was the centre of the market years ago), but it is also possible that firms
that must issue far from home choose the cheaper market.
In contrast to borrowers, lenders are more likely to cross borders, at least as a
group. The left panel of Table 2 shows that 20 to 30 percent of lending in each
market is by out-of-region lenders. By-volume and by-number results are similar
except for the U.S., where a difference arises because non-U.S. lenders are more
likely to participate in large loans than in small loans. As shown in the middle
panel, lead lenders are somewhat less likely to be domiciled outside the market,
especially in the U.S., where only 12 percent of lead lenders are foreign.
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Borut Vojinovi~
Borrower domicile              U.S. market               European market            Asian & SW     
                                                                                                                         Pacific market 
United States 
Europe  
Latin America  
Canada  
Asia & SW Pacific 
Other  
Total 
98,5 
1,7 
 6,0 
80,5 
 0,9 
              15,1 
100 
 1,2 
98,0 
93,0 
19,4 
 6,9 
79,0 
100 
0,3 
0,3 
1,0 
0,1 
             92,2 
5,9 
100 Table 2. Out-of-market lender share of loans in each market
Data are for all multi-lender loans reported in Loanware as made in the three
markets during 1992-2002 that include information about participating lenders’
shares of the amount of the loan. Results are similar if loans for which shares are
missing are included by assuming each lender takes an equal share.
Although lenders cross borders more than borrowers, the fractions in Table 2
are small enough to hint that lenders may be subject to home bias (as noted pre-
viously, “bias” may not be the best term for the loan market, but I follow the lit-
erature’s terminology). The degree to which loan portfolios mimic the world
loan portfolio cannot be measured accurately with Loanware data because many
bank assets are not syndicated loans (and some syndicated loans do not appear in
Loanware). However, virtually all banks have substantial volumes of loans that
are almost by necessity domestic because such loans are originated to small firms
through domestic branches. Thus, lenders that seek to invest in the world loan
portfolio should overweight foreign borrowers in the syndicated-loan portion of
their portfolios.
Table 3 presents lenders’ portfolio allocations of syndicated loans to borrow-
ers in different regions. For example, the first column shows that U.S.-domiciled
lenders channel 91 percent of their syndicated lending volume to U.S. borrowers,
6 percent to European and 3 percent to Other-region borrowers. The right panel
gives the share of loan volume to borrowers in each region in the global syndicat-
ed loan portfolio as represented by Loanware. This is an estimate of the portfolio
shares that would appear in other columns of Table 3 if lenders seek to hold the
world syndicated loan portfolio. Like other assets, it appears that syndicated loan
portfolios display substantial home bias. Lenders in each region are overweight
borrowers in their home region by about 30 to 40 percentage points. That is, the
degree of home bias is similar for lenders in different regions.
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capital
  Percentage of lenders 
from outside the market  
By volume       By number 
Percentage of lead 
lenders from outside 
the market 
By number 
Number of 
lenders 
in syndicate 
Median       Mean 
Market  
 
U.S.  
Europe  
Asia 
    29                               21  
    23                               20  
    21                               19  
12 
19 
17 
   4                     8  
   8                    11  
   7                     9  Table 3. Home bias: Portfolio allocations of lenders in each region.
Data are for all multi-lender loans reported in Loanware as made in the three
markets during 1992-2002 that include information about participating lenders’
shares of the amount of the loan. Results are similar if loans with missing shares
are included by assuming each lender takes an equal share, except that under
such assumptions, lenders from the other region have shares of 40, 14 and 46
percent in loans to U.S., European and other borrowers, respectively. 
The final row of Table 3 gives the shares of lenders from each region in the
global market. U.S. lenders’ share, at about 50 percent, is smaller than U.S. bor-
rowers’ share, which is about 67 percent (the latter not shown in table), whereas
European and Other-region lenders’ shares are somewhat larger than those of
borrowers from the same region.
4. PRICING
As noted, I focus on the U.S. and European markets in analyzing pricing and
I restrict attention to borrowers from industrialized nations. In part, I do so
because I expect integration to be most complete for these markets and borrow-
ers. Moreover, I usually omit Asian loan markets because usable loan samples are
relatively small and because the 1997 Asia crisis complicates interpretation of
results. I omit borrowers from emerging-market nations because a greater role
for country-risk effects on borrower credit quality complicates analysis and
interpretation. I examine all-in interest rate spreads at origination because all
our sample loans are floating-rate instruments, so borrowing costs differ across
firms only to the extent that spreads and fees differ. The main challenge is con-
trolling for differences in borrower characteristics and in the non-price terms of
loans, particularly credit risk, since that is the primary risk borne by lenders.
Ratings are my primary measure of credit quality. Table 4 displays the distribu-
tion of loan volume in each market by agency grade for loans to borrowers for
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Borrower region 
Lender region 
       US                 Europe                 Other  
Global  
weight 
US  
Europe 
Other 
Total 
Memo: Lender 
region share 
         91                     39                        31  
           6                     51                        12  
           3                     10                        57  
       100                   100                      100  
 
         49                     35                        16    
    64 
    22 
    14 
  100 which I have a rating at the time the loan contract was signed. As noted, I use the
riskier of Moody’s and S&P’s rating if both are available (results are qualitatively
similar if I use one or the other). Loans to below-investment-grade borrowers are
substantially less common in the European market, whereas AAA and AA-rated
borrowers are more common. That I require a rating for the borrower at
issuance greatly reduces the size of the sample usable for pricing analysis. Many
borrowers are not rated, especially in the European market, and Loanware does
not always report ratings for rated borrowers, although my match to Moody’s
DRS database mitigates the latter problem.
Table 4. Distribution of borrowers by rating 
Data are for all multi-lender loans reported in Loanware as made in the three
markets during 1992-2002 and that have a rating reported in Loanware, or a rat-
ing I was able to locate by matching to Moody’s DRS database. However, all
loans are in the denominator of the measures in the Memo line. Ratings are the
riskier of Moody’s and S&P ratings when both are available and are as of the loan
contract date. Values are percentages of total loan volume.
Table 5 shows that simple mean spreads differ in European and U.S. markets.
The first two columns of the left panel display mean spreads by grade for the U.S.
and European markets for the whole period 1992-2002 for loans to borrowers in
industrialized nations. Pricing is similar on average for the AA and A grades, but
spreads are 27, 54 and 66 basis points smaller on average in the European market
for the BBB, BB, and B grades, respectively. Differences are somewhat less dra-
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capital
                                                                                        Market 
Rating                                                                       U.S.             European                                    
Investment grade (percent)                                    73                      88  
AAA and AA                                                              9                        19 
A                                                                                 35                       43 
BBB                                                                            28                       25  
 
Speculative grade (percent)                                    27                      12  
BB                                                                              14                        7 
B                                                                                 12                         6 
Less than B                                                                 1                         0 
 
Memo: Percent of total volume                              66                      40 
by unrated borrowers  matic when borrowers from emerging-market nations are included in the sam-
ple, as shown in Panel B of the table.
Table 5. Mean spreads by grade and market (basis points)
The sample is restricted to loans to borrowers for which a rating is available
on the date the loan contract is signed. Ratings are the riskier of Moody’s and
S&P’s rating if both are available. Spreads are all-in measures that include the
contract spread on outstanding balances plus annual fee plus any upfront fee
prorated over the original term to maturity of the loan. Fixed-rate loans, loans
with no spread information, notes, and loans with purposes ESOP, debtor-in-
possession, and private placements are excluded.
4.1 DIFFERENCE IN EUROPEAN AND U.S. MARKET SPREADS
Figure 2 sheds more light on how average pricing differences across the two
markets vary by grade and over time. It displays estimates of year-by-year differ-
ences in spreads across the two markets in the form of coefficient values on inter-
actions of a European-market dummy with year-of-issuance dummies from
regressions estimated separately for each grade (un-interacted European market
dummies are also included, so those shown in Figure 2 are marginal effects). A
and BBB grades are in the top panel and BB and B in the bottom. Only 4 of the 44
coefficients are positive. Although the top panel appears to display no trend, a bit
of a trend toward relatively lower European market spreads is evident for the
junk grades. 
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Borut Vojinovi~
Rating  Panel A. Borrowers from  
industrialized nations only  
Panel B. Borrowers from  
all nations 
  U.S.         European  
  market       market          Difference 
  U.S.         European  
  market     market         Difference  
 
      
     AA 
       A 
    BBB 
      BB 
       B 
  30                      32                 -2 
  44                      40                  4 
  92                      65                27 
182                     128               54 
255                     189               66 
   31                 31                  0  
   44                 41                  3  
   92                 78                14  
 186               152                34  
 249               204                45   Figure 2. Estimates of mean difference in European and U.S. market spreads by
year and grade.
Estimates are the coefficients on dummy variables that interact a European-
market dummy with year dummies, from separate regressions for loans to bor-
rowers in each grade.
Overall, even though some hypotheses of equality of spread differences over
time are rejected, I am not persuaded that trends exist in loan spread differences
across the two markets. The apparent trend toward convergence of pricing for
loans to A-rated borrowers is driven by the unusual year-2000 observation that is
evident in Figure 2. I cannot reject a hypothesis of equality between the early and
late periods for BBB and BB. And the pricing sample includes only 39 European-
market loans to B-rated borrowers during 1999-2002. I am reluctant to conclude
that there has been a trend away from pricing convergence based on such a rela-
tively small subsample.
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capital5. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION EFFECTS
Diamond (1984) and James (1987), among many others, argue that banks
mitigate problems of asymmetric information. Degryce and Ongena (2003) and
Petersen and Rajan (2002) focus on the effect of distance on information costs
and lending, and Hadlock and James (2002) note that some firms may choose to
issue in higher-cost markets in which their quality is not clearly revealed. Taken
together, the body of such work suggests that the identity of lenders may matter,
that is, the same borrower might pay different spreads to one set of lenders than
to another because of differences in lenders’ information about the borrower’s
credit quality. 
The existence of such differences may represent a constrained efficient out-
come if some borrowers wish to avoid revealing their type. Loan size and rating
migration variables may control for asymmetric-information effects to some
extent, but not completely. If lenders’ ability to mitigate information problems is
correlated with differences in lender and borrower nationality, and if lender
nationality patterns differ across markets, then observed differences in pricing
might be due to information effects. I add indicators for the presence of any
lender with nationality different from that of the borrower and for any lead
lender with nationality different from that of the borrower, both separately and
together. In another set of regressions, I add variables measuring the fraction of
lenders with nationality different from that of the borrower and the fraction of
lead lenders with different nationality, again both separately and together; and in
other regressions whether there are any, and the fraction of, lenders and lead
lenders from outside the borrower’s home region, again separately and together.
I would expect economically statistically significantly positive coefficients on (at
least some) of these variables if differences in lender and borrower nationality
make it more difficult for lenders to understand borrower credit quality. Results
for these variables are not shown in tables because in no case does their addition
have a material effect on the coefficients of the European market dummies.
Moreover, coefficients on the additional variables are economically small and
never statistically significant for investment-grade loans. In seven of the dozen
regressions involving only junk loans, at least one of these variables is statistically
significant at the ten percent level, but magnitudes are small (usually around an
implied 5 basis point maximum effect) and signs differ. Most of the significant
cases involve lead-lender variables, that is, the presence of any lead lender (or a
higher fraction of lead lenders) with nationality different from the borrower is
associated with higher spreads. However, a higher fraction of lenders in any role
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Borut Vojinovi~with nationality different from the borrower is associated with slightly smaller
spreads. 
It seems less likely that lenders of different nationality would differ in their
ability to mitigate information problems for all borrowers. Overall, the data offer
little support that differences in lender ability to mitigate information problems
are at the heart of the cross-market pricing differences I observe. It is important
to note that results do not imply that asymmetric information is unimportant.
The statistical and economic significance of loan size and rating-migration vari-
ables could be interpreted as evidence that asymmetric information is generally
important in the syndicated loan market. However, evidence does imply that
lenders’ ability to manage information problems is not stronger for borrowers
located in their own domicile or region, implying that nationality differences per
se, or distance per se, are not particularly important to syndicated loan pricing. 
5.1 EX POST MONITORING
Berlin and Mester (1991) and Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that loan
covenants and loan renegotiation play an important role in alleviating moral
hazard, especially asset substitution. Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell (1992) and
Carey, Sharpe and Post (1998) extend the idea, arguing that differences in
lenders’ tendency to hold up borrowers during renegotiations, and lenders’ rep-
utation for doing so, are an important determinant of the structure of financial
markets. A lender with a reputation for agreeing to reasonable contract revisions
is preferred by borrowers, other things equal, and can charge higher spreads at
origination, 
but such a lender must protect its reputation by avoiding borrowers that will
require harsh discipline because such discipline will harm the lender’s reputa-
tion. It is possible that lenders of different nationality may have renegotiation
policies and reputations that differ across nations because of differences in
home-market law, regulation, and financial system structure. A lender that
chooses renegotiation policies that are optimal for its domestic market may
essentially offer a different loan product in the eyes of global syndicated loan
market borrowers than a lender from another nation, and thus spreads may dif-
fer with lender nationality.
5.2 RATING AGENCIES APPLY DIFFERENT STANDARDS TO DIFFERENT BORROWERS
Many non-US borrowers complain of a U.S. bias on the part of Moody’s and
S&P. If such rating agencies grade non-US borrowers as riskier than actually-
equivalent-risk U.S. borrowers, I would expect to see lower average spreads in
the European market, which is dominated by European borrowers, than in the
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capitalU.S. market. In this case, European borrowers assigned a given agency grade
would be safer than U.S. borrowers in the same grade and would borrow at lower
spread, presuming the market perceives and prices risk correctly. This explana-
tion is difficult to test directly because it amounts to a hypothesis of omitted vari-
able bias results and lack a proxy for rating agency bias. Moreover, sample of
European loans is too small to provide meaningful measures of ex post default
rates by grade, which in a large sample and in the long run should reveal any bias.
However, several pieces of circumstantial evidence weigh against this
hypothesis: 
• Ammer and Packer (2000) find no evidence of geographic differences in
default rates by grade.
• U.S. firms should pay the same spreads in the European market and in the
U.S. market, but results presented previously imply otherwise. 
• If ratings are biased by borrower nationality, it seems likely the bias would
be smaller for the industrialized European nations that form the bulk of our
pricing sample, and especially for the U.K., which has a market-oriented
financial system similar to the U.S.
Thus, I would expect differences in European- and U.S.- market simple
mean spreads in Table 5 to be larger when emerging-market borrowers are
included in the sample, as in Panel B of Table 5, but in fact they are smaller.
5.3 REGULATION
McCauley and Seth (1992) argue that, through the early 1990s, Japanese
banks had a lower cost of capital than other banks because they were permitted
to operate with smaller capital ratios. However, the Basel Accord harmonized
capital regulation beginning in 1992. If other regulations (or national differences
in de facto implementation of the Accord) are responsible for the price differ-
ences I observe, implications for lender-nationality effects on spreads are similar
to those for the monitoring explanation discussed previously. That is, regulation
should cause lenders from a given nation to behave differently everywhere, so
lender nationality should be significantly correlated with price differences. 
6. PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION EFFECTS
The contribution of a loan to a bank’s portfolio credit risk posture may also
affect the loan’s interest rate spread in a manner that differs systematically with
nationality. The conventional benchmark case in which all investors in an asset
class hold the world portfolio for that class is not realistic for banks because part
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Borut Vojinovi~of their portfolios are associated with domestic small business and consumer
loans originated through branch networks. Thus, banks tend to have large core
exposures to home country credit risk, but the degree of such core exposure dif-
fers across nations according to the share of core loans in bank portfolios.
Because a bank’s reservation price for making a loan should depend on the
extent to which the loan diversifies or concentrates its portfolio credit risk, and a
borrower’s nationality may affect concentration differently for different banks,
spreads may differ systematically for different pairings of lender-borrower
nationality. This hypothesis is difficult to test directly because banks portfolios of
credit risk positions are unobservable, but two pieces of circumstantial evidence
suggest otherwise. First, if the syndicated loan market is a primary vehicle for
diversifying the unavoidable credit risk from branch-originated loans, one would
expect banks to prefer foreign to domestic borrowers in the syndicated loan mar-
ket, but in fact lenders display home bias. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997) and others suggest that a country’s legal tradition influences
the nature and efficiency of its financial system. Legal tradition rather than
nationality per se might drive some of the nationality-related explanations pre-
sented previously. Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) find substantial changes in
underwriting costs borne by issuers in European bond and stock markets as the
euro came into use. They argue that reduced legal and regulatory barriers
increasingly favour underwriters operating at large scale, which in turn has led to
greater competition between established underwriters and new entrants as each
attempts to be among the survivors. Although U.S.-based commercial and
investment banks have increased their activities in the European market over the
past decade, increased competition associated with European integration does
not explain the fairly stable difference in investment-grade loan spreads that I
observe since 1992.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I offer evidence that syndicated corporate loan spreads are significantly
smaller in Europe than in the U.S., suggesting that a market-location factor is
correlated with economically important components of the intermediation
process. Systematic differences across the two markets in loan and borrower
characteristics do not appear to account for the pricing difference. Importantly,
nationality per se, such as borrower or lender nationality within Europe, is not
highly correlated with spreads when controls for risk are included. The relatively
small number of U.S. firms that issue in the European market pay European-
market spreads, not U.S.-market spreads. These and other facts cast doubt on
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World corporate loan markets for raising new capitalmany potential explanations drawn from the literature on financial intermedia-
tion, including explanations focusing on differences in asymmetric information
and moral hazard, creditor rights, multi-product pricing discounts, rating
dynamics, and regulation. While many of proxy variables are correlated with
loan spreads, differences in spreads in the two markets remain. I also find little
evidence of a trend toward convergence of spreads. I describe the pricing differ-
ence as a puzzle because its size and persistence is suggestive of an equilibrium
phenomenon (a pure failure of arbitrage on this scale by the large, sophisticated
participants in the syndicated loan market is difficult to accept). 
Several avenues of future research might solve the puzzle and enhance
understanding of corporate finance and financial intermediation. One avenue
might focus on why borrowers do not cross borders. I find that borrowers domi-
ciled in a region that hosts a major syndicated loan market usually issue there.
However, borrowers domiciled elsewhere generally choose to issue in Europe,
where spreads are lower. This suggests that issuing out of home market is costly,
potentially explaining why so few U.S. firms issue in Europe, which is an impor-
tant element of the puzzle. I show that lender portfolios display significant home
bias. Research that reveals how home bias interferes with arbitrage by lenders,
and why home bias persists in equilibrium, might also help solve the puzzle.
Evidence may also indicate that economically important aspects of financial
intermediation and corporate finance remain to be discovered. That is, loans
made in the European and U.S. markets actually differ materially along some
dimension relevant to price. One possibility is that important mechanisms have
not yet been modeled. Another is that mechanisms already in the literature work
differently in Europe and the U.S. If the latter is the case, research that reveals
how and why the workings of such mechanisms depend on region (but not on
nationality per se) would be valuable. Another possibility is that there is no true
puzzle but that variables I use are poor proxies for the factors that drive pricing. I
use conventional intuition and proxies associated with theories of lending. If
they are inadequate in this exercise, this raises concerns about their adequacy in
other contexts. Thus, more research on empirical measures would be valuable.
Similarly, although circumstantial evidence argues against inconsistencies in
credit ratings causing the results I obtain, research on ratings that reveals such
inconsistencies could solve the puzzle and be useful to market participants and
researchers.
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